In the early 1900’s, the once tiny one-room, single story schoolhouses started to transform into multi-room and multi-story buildings. These structures were built with little or no fire protection or life safety features incorporated into their design.

The reason for this is simple, the technology just did not exist. Another reason for having these factors left out was that most standards and model codes did not exist at the time or that their scope was limited. An ever-increasing population within the community soon contributed to classrooms becoming overcrowded, which gave the appearance of “human stockyards”. These facts combined with the lack of fire protection and life safety features added up to a deadly combination referred to as the “Disaster cocktail”, which had already been stirred.

 During a rather routine school day, one of these schools became a deathtrap for teachers and students alike. When everyone in the school became aware that a fire had started within the school, it was too late for escape. The fire had started on the basement level and made its way up through the brick and wood structure rapidly due to the use of “balloon” construction. Within moments exiting the school was useless due to heat, smoke, and flames. Conditions then deteriorated rapidly and students began to panic. 
 

Children began to trample other children in the hope of escaping the now raging inferno. Some children fell dead were they stood due to either toxic smoke gases, extreme radiant heat or burns received by the oncoming flames. Fire exits could not be reached or were locked. Panic set in and the teachers could not maintain order. Although all of this was transpiring at a maddening pace, one teacher was successful in getting her students down an exit stairwell.

As the school burned, horrified parents rushed to the building and witnessed children trapped at the windows. The onlookers witnessed the smoke and fires greatly intensify within the structure.  As the citizens of this community witnessed this horror, inside the children’s bodies began to pile even higher. The fire department arrived, but due to the fire having gained such a big advantage, any action taken could not have prevented the loss of more young lives.

As a result of this fire having taken place in a school full of children, Americans began to examine, study, and institute fire protection and life safety standards for school structures. New fire laws and standards for construction were enforced. This combined with a new attitude towards establishing safer schools for children was soon to be realized.  Unfortunately, loss of life in fires involving school buildings would not end with this blaze. A fire 50 years later at the “Our Lady of the Angels” catholic school in Chicago, would not only claim the lives of the innocent, but, would change once again the standards which our schools would be built and maintained.

The fire and outcome told in our introduction was taken from accounts given of the “Lake View Elementary” school fire. This fire occurred in Collinwood, Ohio in the year 1908 and claimed 175 lives. Other fires involving schools would occur and would claim the lives of both children as well as adults. 

On December 24, 1924, grade school children were performing an annual Christmas songfest at the Babb Switch School in Hobart, Oklahoma when fire erupted. A candle placed on the top of a Christmas tree, located on the schools stage fell into the tree branches causing the tree to burst into flames. Parents seeing the fire rushed the stage to rescue the children. The children unaware of why everyone was rushing at them began to retreat. This caused the tree to topple. The play had been taking place in the rear of a one-room schoolhouse, which happened to be the farthest distance from an exit. The fire then forced the children farther to the rear of the stage. This led to the children becoming trapped with no avenue for escape. Parents grabbed children and ran through the flames towards the only exit door. Men arrived and began pulling bodies through the exit door. The door had become jammed due to the onslaught of humanity. Within minutes the building was incinerated along with the loss of thirty-six lives. Most being small children.

 The Cleveland Rural Grade School fire happened on May 7, 1923. The fire started on the second story of the building while the students were enacting a play. The auditorium was also located on the second story. At the time all the lights were out except for a kerosene lamp. The lamp was hanging behind gauze like material that was acting as a filter for the light. This was done to give the stage a certain feeling by diffusing the light coming from the lantern. Between acts the stage props were moved and one of the sceneries struck the lantern. The lantern fell and then exploded into flames. 

Parents and students, having noticed the fire exited the auditorium and waited in the stairwell and hallway while older students began to fight the fire. Soon the flames were burning unimpeded. Panic ensued. Parents rushed the corridor and stairwell trying to exit the second floor. Parents on the first floor realizing that a fire was burning rapidly on the second floor rushed the stairwell attempting to reach the second floor. People became wedged in the stairwell and were unable to move. The tremendous weight being placed on the ancient structure thus led to catastrophic failure of the stairway. A mother on the second floor began to herd children to the windows were she began to drop and toss them out. This happened only after breaking the locks on the windows. Three hundred people were in the building at the time of the fire. Seventy-six perished: forty-one would be children.

 The Cleveland Rural Grade School collapsed within five minutes of the fire starting. In order for collapse in a structure like this, it is evident of one thing, that the building was extremely deteriorated. And with no active fire suppression system the consummation of the building by fire happened fast. A strange footnote to this story is that a new school had already been built, and this was to be the last play held in the school before moving into the new school.

 It was a Monday, and the last hour of school had just begun. As was routine in most schools at this time, the teachers charged young male students with the task of taking all trash and excess papers to the basement for disposal by the janitor. One young boy returned and reported to his teacher in room 206 that he had smelled an odor of smoke. The teacher of room 206 investigated, she was able to confirm what the young child had told her. The teacher then proceeded to room 205 and notified that teacher that there was an odor of smoke in the school’s corridor. The time was approximately 2:20pm.
 

The “Our Lady of the Angels” had a rule in place that only the Mother Superior could activate the fire alarm system. The teacher from room 205 proceeded to the principles office on the first floor to inform the mother superior about the odor of smoke. Once at mother superiors office, the teacher found that the mother superior was teaching class elsewhere in the building due to another teacher taking ill. The teacher than returned to room 205 and along with the teacher from room 206 they decided to form up both classes and evacuate the building.

As they began to evacuate the building one of the teachers decided to activate the manual fire alarm. The teacher pulled the manual station that was approximately 7 feet high on a sidewall. The manual device resembled a light switch, and upon flicking the switch the alarm failed to activate. After the children from rooms 205 and 206 had been relocated to the parish rectory the teacher once again returned and attempted to activate the alarm. On the second attempt the alarm activated. This alarm was a “local alarm only” and was not hooked to a central system that would activate and notify the fire department. Eight minutes have now passed since the smoke was first noticed. 
 

During the investigation into the cause of the fire, it was determined to have started in a trash receptacle. A large cardboard barrel was placed at the bottom of the stairwell for the collection of trash. Debris in the barrel ignited, whether the fire was accidental or intentional has never been determined. During the years since the fire two suspects have admitted to starting the blaze, but have recanted their stories. Burn patterns on the stairwell walls was the indicator used by investigators at the scene to determine point of origin.

The fire is believed to have been burning anywhere from ten to twenty minutes before being noticed. A contributing factor in the fire gaining headway was that the lower half of the staircase on the basement level was covered with sheet metal. This allowed heat to radiate onto itself, thus intensifying the rate of rise. The fire is believed to have remained in the incipient stage until a nearby window broke due to the excessive heat. After breaking this added the much-needed oxygen to the smoldering blaze, this allowed the fire to enter the free-burning stage rapidly.

 The rate of rise was so great that the flames had and immediate impact on the staircasing. The treads on the steps had an asphalt and rubber tiling on them. This is one of the many contributing factors that added to the fire growth. The fire then spread to the walls, which were covered with combustible finishes, paints and varnishes. During the post-investigation the walls were found to be covered with as much as fourteen layers of coatings such as these. The top two layers were made of an exterior flammable rubberized-plastic paint. The fire then began to spread rapidly up the stairwell while being fed by these flammable coatings. 

 The first floor of the school was equipped with fire doors. This allowed the heat, smoke, and fire to bypass the first floor and concentrated the force of the fire. This was then funneled to the second floor. The second floor was not equipped with fire doors, which allowed the entrained heat and flames a direct path into the second floor hallway. On the second floor, at least two teachers noticed a sudden rise in heat. This was felt in separate rooms on the second floor. They both contributed this to the janitor adjusting the boiler temperature. Also in the basement was a pipe chase that fed directly into the second floor overhead ceiling area. This allowed heat to collect within the ceiling structure leading to the collection of hot gases. This is believed to have caused a secondary burn or flashover event to occur. 

 An assistant who was working in the rectory of the church had reported the fire to the central dispatch of the fire department. This happened after the janitor had noticed smoke pouring from the school while returning from an errand. He then rushed to the rectory and requested that someone call the fire department. During the initial call, the assistant having thought the church was on fire had given the address to the dispatcher as being 3808 W. Iowa, the address of the school was actually 909 N. Avers. This mistake in address directed fire apparatus to the church. Companies arrived within three minutes only to find that the church was not the scene of the fire, but that the school was. This required the relocation of the arriving apparatus. 

 The priest of the parish along with civilians who noticed the fire, attempted to evacuate and rescue children from the school. Many civilians attempted to reach the second floor windows with the use of portable ladders. The rescuers then discovered that they could not reach the second floor, at this time they began to call to the children to jump.

 The population of the second floor at the onset of the fire was 329 students and six nuns. All the classrooms had noticed the smoke by now. In two of the classrooms it is believed that the nuns ordered the children to remain seated and to pray that God would send the firemen to save them. Some over the years has disputed this fact. In the book “Blaze: The Forensics of Fire”, Nicholas Faith states that “rumors” spread (after the fire), that the nuns had imposed a fatal inaction on their pupils, by having them pray at their desk when they could have escaped. Nicholas Faith with the use of forensic science has concluded that the children and nuns had no chance to escape from the U-shaped structure. 

 If the nuns did request the children to pray for divine intervention then it was only short lived. Soon panic set in and chaos became the rule. The heat and flames reached the transoms located above the doors, soon the transom glass began to crack. When the transoms broke this allowed the fire to begin racing across the ceiling area of the classrooms. Flames racing across the ceiling, superheated gases above the ceiling, and combustible ceiling tiles became a disaster cocktail. A flashover occurred due to the combining of these factors.

 The children rushed the windows and many began to jump in order to escape a certain death. Escape for the children was hindered due to the bottom ledge of the window being thirty-seven and one-half inches high. This obstacle alone became overwhelming for many children to overcome. Many of the children died instantly, some while still seated at their desks. Others fell dead as their clothes and hair ignited spontaneously while awaiting rescue at the windows sills. Others also perished in their leap from the second story and many others were severely injured.

 The fire department arrived at a scene after relocating only to find what has been described as “A great and indescribable horror.” The first in company requested a 5-11 alarm. This request dispatched all the cities medical units to the location of the school fire. The 5-11 request made by the engine company officer was a direct violation of the 5-11 request protocol of the Chicago Fire Department. Civilians and fire department personnel using ground ladders made many attempts at rescuing the children. The roof of the school soon fell inward and further attempts at saving these young lives was an attempt at futility. Any children left in the windows soon disappeared into the flames or vanished from sight.

At 3:45pm, the fire at the “Our Lady of the Angels” school was brought under control. One hour and twenty-five minutes had passed since the fire was first noticed.

 One engine company who arrived at the wrong address saw heavy fire conditions coming from a rear stairwell. The Captain ordered his men to attack the fire with a deuce and a half, little did they know that they were suppressing the seat of the blaze. During the investigation, charges were sought against the engine company officer for failure to assist in the rescue. In subsequent findings it was determined that the actions of the engine company were instrumental in “buying time” for rescuers, and through their actions the lives of many were saved. 

During the official inquiry into the school blaze, the fire department was accredited with saving 160 children and nuns in the first thirteen minutes. Unofficially the count was closer to two hundred lives that had been saved. This was of little condolence to the firefighters who were haunted, and who still are by the sight and screams of the children who perished within their sight.

 After the fire, the Catholic Church set up a panel to review each case, and reward monetary settlements to those who had lost children or loved one’s in the fire. This was done purposely by the Chicago Catholic Archdiocese to avoid lawsuits  and the awarded settlements that would have gone to the families and survivors of the fire.
 
 

During the investigation, many discrepancies were discovered. They included:

• Stacked combustibles at the bottom of the stairwell.
• No sprinkler system.
• No smoke or heat detectors.
• The school had passed a recent fire inspection conducted two months prior to the blaze. This inspection would be based upon the 1905 ordinance, which did not require automatic fire protection systems.
• The school had the number of exits required by the 1905 ordinance.
• A locked fire escape door was found.
• Overcrowding in the school.
• Sloppy house keeping, as determined by the Austin police department.
• Lack of panic hardware on school exit doors.
• Four fire extinguishers located on each floor of the north wing at the school. The extinguishers were hung approximately seven feet above the floor level.
• Fire extinguishers were legal at no more than 75 feet apart.
• The 1949 fire ordinance would have limited the student load from 329 to 232 due to the ordinance calling for 20 sq. feet per student.

An independent investigator concluded that: 

• Fire spread in an upper portion of the school was most unusual.
• Fire smoldered for approximately one-half to forty-five minutes before discovery and transmittal of the alarm.
• Trash was allowed to accumulate at the base of the stairwell.
• A peer review by a jury made recommendations that was non-binding. The recommendations were that:
•  Approved automatic fire suppressions are provided to schools.
•  The enclosure of all vertical passageways with incombustible construction. *Note: the term incombustible was a term used in 1959. This term was incorrect and was later changed to non-combustible.
•  Provide approved fire doors to all corridors for increased protection.
•  Provide approved fire barrier doors at all corridor and room partitioning openings.
•  Provide approved auto internal fire alarm systems with smoke and heat detectors incorporated and linked directly to fire department headquarters.
• The NFPA held the city of Chicago and Our Lady of the Angels accountable for failing life safety obligations.

Due to the severity of this tragedy improvements were made upon:

• Placement of fire alarm “street boxes.” They were to be located no more that 100 feet from the front of the school.
• Monthly fire drills.
• The States General Assembly passed life safety codes
• The city of Chicago adopted retroactive amendments to the building code otherwise known as the Municipal Building Code of Chicago. This affected all city schools, both public and private, and of two or more stories of ordinary frame construction with wooden floors and joist.

• A new gymnasium
• New school lockers
• Auditorium remodeling
• New carpet
• Swimming pool repairs
• New bleachers
• Running track resurfacing
• Replacing chalkboards
• Improving athletic field drainage
• To remove a teachers lounge
• Building a learning center.

For further information and research materials on the “Our Lady of the Angels” school fire see:

Babcock, Chester L. and Wilson, Rexford. “The Chicago school fire”.
Mass. Quarterly of the NFPA, January 1959.

Bilina, Carole and Burkholder, Alex. “Why couldn’t we save those kids”.
New York, Firehouse Magazine, April 1977.

Brenner, Howard, “On a gray winter day in Chicago”,
New York, Firehouse Magazine, December 1994, Pages 30-34.

Cowan, David and Kuenster, John, “To sleep with the angels, the story of a fire”.
Ivan R Dee, Inc. Chicago 1996.

Nash, Jay Robert, “Darkest Hours”.
New York, Wallaby Press. 1977.

Related:
Michelle McBride;survived Our Lady of Angels blaze 

About the author:
Thomas Cunningham currently serves as a career firefighter at The US Naval Academy Fire Department in Annapolis, Maryland since 1988. He has also served as a line officer with the Glen Burnie Volunteer Fire Company in Glen Burnie, Maryland. He is the state coordinator for the National Fire Academy Alumni Association, member of the NFPA and NAFI. He is also finishing his B.S. degree in Fire Safety Engineering at Western Illinois University. He also holds IFSAC Certification as a Fire officer IV, Instructor III, Investigator, Inspector II, Safety officer, and HAZMAT incident commander. Questions or comments welcomed:dkkght@hotmail.com